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“Visionary	feminism	offers	us	hope	for	the	future,”	asserts	black	feminist	theorist	
bell	hooks	(1952–).	“By	emphasizing	an	ethics	of	mutuality	and	interdependency	
feminist	thinking	offers	us	a	way	to	end	domination	while	simultaneously	
changing	the	impact	of	inequality”	(2015,	117).	Feminist	theorist	Elizabeth	Grosz	
(1952–)	argues	that	a	“minimal	defining	condition”	of	feminism	is	that	it	“aspires	
to	change,	to	innovation,	to	the	future”	(2000,	14).	Similarly,	feminist	cultural	
theorists	Sara	Ahmed,	Jane	Kilby,	Celia	Lury,	and	colleagues	link	feminism	with	
transformation	and	note	that	feminism	“involves	a	belief	in	the	possibility	of	a	
better	future”	(2000,	6).	But	despite	these	affirmations	of	futurity	from	many	
theorists,	the	status	of	the	future	has	also	been	significantly	debated.	J.	Jack	
Halberstam	(1961–),	a	feminist	and	queer	theorist,	explores	how	a	range	of	
representations	of	queer	and	transgender	people	in	contemporary	popular	
culture	indicate	the	possibility,	or	impossibility,	of	alternative	futures	for	
minority	and	marginalized	groups	(2005).	Queer	theorist	José	Esteban	Muñoz	
(1967–2013)	nonetheless	understands	queerness	in	terms	of	futurity:	“We	are	
not	yet	queer.	We	may	never	touch	queerness,	but	we	can	feel	it	as	the	warm	
illumination	of	a	horizon	imbued	with	potentiality.	We	have	never	been	queer,	
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yet	queerness	exists	for	us	as	an	ideality	that	can	be	distilled	from	the	past	and	
used	to	imagine	a	future”	(2009,	1).	
	
As	these	examples	suggest,	for	scholars	and	activists	concerned	with	gender	and	
sexuality	it	is	important	to	consider	how	the	future	might	be	different	from	the	
past	and	present	and,	in	various	ways,	contribute	to	bringing	these	better	futures	
into	being.	A	central	objective	of	gender	and	sexuality	studies	is	to	point	out	the	
significance	of	intersecting	differences	and	positionalities—such	as	gender,	
sexuality,	race,	class,	and	disability—in	how	power	works	in	the	present	day,	but	
another	objective	is	to	argue	for	change.	Gender	and	sexuality	studies	is,	
therefore,	in	part,	organized	around	a	desire	for	transformation	of	the	present	
into	a	future	that	is	different	and	better.	What	these	theories	also	suggest	is	that,	
in	any	consideration	of	the	future,	it	is	impossible	to	completely	separate	it	from	
other	temporalities;	the	future	is	not	a	distinct	temporality	but,	rather,	is	always	
in	conjunction	with	the	past	and	present.	
	
This	chapter	takes	up	the	interest	in	the	future	in	feminist	and	queer	theory	to	
examine	affective	futurity—that	is,	the	relationship	between	the	future	and	
affect.	Affect	here	refers	to	sensations	and	forces	that	are	felt	in	the	body	and	that	
move	or	orient	that	body	in	certain	ways.	As	forces,	sensations,	and	movements,	
affect	is	in	some	ways	evasive	and	uncontainable.	In	terms	of	the	relationship	
between	the	future	and	affect,	this	chapter	considers	how,	as	a	time	that	is	not-
yet,	the	future	can	be	understood	as	affective—it	is	a	temporality	that	is	felt	and	
around	which	present	action	is	oriented	but	it	is	not	quite	tangible	or	fully	
actualized,	in	the	sense	of	being	made	actual.	The	actual	in	this	chapter	refers	to	
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a	condition	that	is	concrete,	tangible,	existent.	While	the	future	may	be	in	the	
process	of	being	actualized—or	made	actual—it	can	never	be	actual.	
	
Drawing	on	work	in	feminist,	queer,	cultural,	and	social	theory,	this	chapter	first	
explores	two	specific	ways	in	which	affective	futurity	might	be	conceived:	one	of	
these	is	potentiality,	or	the	notion	that	the	future	is	a	potential	that	is	never	quite	
grasped	or	made	actual;	the	other	is	intensity,	which	suggests	that	temporality	be	
understood	not	(only)	as	an	externally	organized	linear	progression	that	moves	
from	past	to	present	to	future	but	is	(also)	encountered,	and	experienced	
intensely,	in	and	through	bodies,	subjects,	and	social	groups.	The	chapter	also	
discusses	two	different	affective	modes	or	regimes	of	feeling	or	orienting	around	
the	future	that	have	been	identified	in	cultural	and	feminist	theory	as	
particularly	significant	in	understanding	how	contemporary	Western	societies	
are	organized	and	experienced.	These	are	anticipation,	where	the	present	is	
organized	around,	acted	upon,	or	working	toward	a	particular	future,	and	
preemption,	where	the	future	is	brought	into	the	present	in	an	attempt	to	
prevent	or	forestall	an	action	from	happening.	The	chapter	then	considers	the	
affective	registers	of	(cruel)	optimism	(Berlant	2011)	and	of	hope,	in	each	of	
which	the	future	is	felt	and	oriented	around,	albeit	with	different	affects	and	
effects.	
	
These	six	different	modes,	regimes,	and	registers—potentiality,	intensity,	
anticipation,	preemption,	(cruel)	optimism,	and	hope—are	introduced	not	as	
oppositions	but	rather	as	different	ways	in	which	affective	futurity	can	be	
conceived,	sensed,	and	experienced.	They	are	also	seen	as	challenging	the	way	in	
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which—since	the	emergence	of	industrial	capitalism—Western	societies	have	
been	“inescapably	wedded	to	innovation	and	progress”	(Adam	and	Groves	2007,	
1)	and	have	tended	to	see	time	as	a	straightforward,	progressive	movement	from	
the	past	to	the	future.	
	
To	unpack	these	issues	and	ideas,	the	chapter	offers	examples	of	self	and	body	
transformation,	discussed	in	terms	of	obesity	and	dieting,	beauty,	and	biomedical	
practices.	The	chapter	is	concerned	with	how	power	works	affectively	and	
temporally	and	is	likewise	concerned	with	the	ways	in	which	feminist	and	queer	
theory	have	conceived	and	might	further	engage	with	such	issues.	
	
Affect,	Potentiality,	and	Intensity	
To	begin	to	untangle	the	significance	of	the	future	to	some	feminist	and	queer	
theorists,	and	at	the	same	time	to	take	seriously	those	theorists	who	point	out	
the	necessity	of	understanding	the	future	in	relation	to	other	temporalities,	it	is	
helpful	to	consider	the	future	as	affective.	In	general	terms,	affect	refers	to	the	
capacity	to	“have	an	influence	on	someone	or	something,	or	to	cause	a	change	in	
someone	or	something”	(Cambridge	Dictionary)	and	to	“move	somebody	
emotionally”	(Encarta	World	English	Dictionary).	As	a	noun,	affect	suggests	a	
force	that	registers	in	and	through	the	body	or	brain	(or	both)	as	feeling	or	
emotion	and	that	can	generate	movement	and	change.	Affect	is	thus	concerned	
with	action	and	activity,	that	is,	with	the	affective	or	the	capacities	for	change	
and	movement.	Since	the	late	twentieth	century,	an	“affective	turn”	in	social	and	
cultural	theory	has	revitalized	interest	in	using	the	notions	of	affect,	feeling,	and	
emotion	to	understand	the	world	in	a	more	nonrepresentational	way.	While	
	
	 5	
wide-ranging	and	coming	from	a	number	of	different	(and	sometimes	
conflicting)	disciplines,	positions,	and	approaches,	these	theories	tend	to	
understand	affect	as	evasive,	ephemeral,	and	effervescent.	Feelings	are	often	
difficult	to	pin	down	and	communicate,	sometimes	because	they	operate	across	
networks	of	human	bodies,	technologies,	spaces,	and	temporalities	in	ways	that	
are	hard	to	disentangle	(such	as	how	a	television	commercial	for	a	mobile	phone	
may	evoke	aspirational	impulses	or	the	atmosphere	of	a	room	can	feel	inviting	or	
foreboding	depending	on	the	quality	of	light,	the	time	of	day,	and	the	people	and	
furniture	within	it)	and	sometimes	because	they	escape	or	exceed	an	ability	to	
put	them	into	words.	Because	affects	are	moving	and	changing,	they	are	also	
difficult	to	capture	or	express	fully	(see	Coleman	2016	for	one	overview	of	affect	
and	its	relevance	to	gender	and	sexuality	studies).	
	
The	affective	turn	has	been	particularly	significant	in	gender	and	sexuality	
studies	due	to	the	prominence	in	those	fields	of	feminist	and	queer	theorists,	
who	have	long	been	interested	in	feelings	and	emotions	and	the	body.	Some	
feminist	and	queer	work	has	focused	on	specific	affects	and	emotions:	these	
include	optimism	(Berlant	2011;	Snediker	2009),	hope	(Muñoz	2009),	happiness	
(Ahmed	2010),	shame	(Probyn	2005),	empathy	(Pedwell	2014),	melancholia	
(Cheng	2001;	Khanna	2003),	and	“ugly	feelings”	more	generally	(Ngai	2004).	
Other	work	has	explored	how	affects	are	produced	through	engagements	with	
technologies	(Paasonen	2011;	Clough	2000;	Clough	et	al.	2014;	Puar	2013).	Still	
other	theorists	have	examined	the	way	that	an	understanding	of	affect	requires	a	
mapping	out	of	how	power	relations	work	affectively:	who	or	what	it	influences,	
who	affects,	and	who	is	affected	(Coleman	2009;	Coleman	2012;	Skeggs	and	
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Wood	2008;	Ringrose	and	Harvey	2015).	In	all	of	this	work,	there	is	a	concern	
with	how	affects	shape	or	constitute	bodies	and	subjectivities	and	how	they	are	
often	associated	with	those	who	are	positioned	as	marginal	(in	contrast	to	the	
rationality	of	the	white,	masculine,	middle-class,	able-bodied	norm).	
	
Drawing	on	this	work	in	terms	of	thinking	about	futurity,	affect	is	productive	
because	it	enables	an	exploration	of	how	the	future	is	difficult	to	access,	capture,	
and	express.	As	noted	above,	the	future	can	be	understood	as	affective	because	it	
is	not-yet,	and	not	actual,	and	it	is	therefore	evasive	and	excessive.	The	future	
may	also	be	understood	as	affective	because	it	is	a	temporality	that	is	felt	and	
oriented	around.	For	example,	taking	up	some	of	the	specific	affects	mentioned	
above,	the	future	may	be	imagined	hopefully	or	optimistically,	and	happiness	
may	be	a	feeling	that	is	never	quite	attained	but	that	operates	as	a	promise	that	
is	located	in	the	future	(Ahmed	2010).	The	chapter	examines	these	senses	of	
affective	futurity,	beginning	with	a	discussion	of	affect	as	evasive	and	excessive,	
and	focusing	on	the	concepts	of	potentiality	and	intensity.	
	
Affective	Futurity	and	Potentiality	
An	understanding	of	affective	futurity	suggests	that	the	future	is	not	fully	
graspable;	as	a	time	that	is	not-yet,	the	future	slips	away	from	what	is.	One	way	
to	think	about	this	elusiveness	of	the	future	is	through	the	notion	of	potentiality.	
If	something	is	potential,	it	is	possible,	perhaps	even	probable,	but	it	is	not	yet	
actual	or	concrete.	Potentiality	is	thus	a	means	of	understanding	how	the	future	
exists	as	something	that	is	not-yet	and	at	the	same	time	exists	as	something	that	
the	present	might	be	oriented	toward.	In	some	of	the	conceptions	of	the	future	in	
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feminist	and	queer	theories	discussed	above,	for	example,	the	possibility	of	the	
future	is	a	central	aspiration	or	motivator;	feminist,	queer,	and	other	progressive	
movements	(such	as	antiracism	and	disability	rights)	are	necessary	because	
there	is	a	conviction	that	a	better	future	is	possible,	and	such	movements	are	
organized	around	this	potentiality	of	a	better	future.	
	
Another	way	in	which	the	future	functions	affectively	as	potentiality,	relevant	to	
gender	and	sexuality	studies,	includes	the	emphasis	on	self-transformation—
through	dieting,	makeovers,	cosmetic	surgery,	and	self-improvement	
programs—in	contemporary	Western	popular	culture	(Swan	2010;	Jones	2008;	
Heyes	2007;	Coleman	2012).	Here,	the	better	future	acts	as	a	normative	image	or	
ideal	to	affectively	appeal	to	and	compel	women	in	particular	to	transform	their	
bodies	and	selves;	the	implied	promise	is	that	if	transformation	is	successful,	the	
future	will	be	happier,	healthier,	and	more	comfortable	for	those	whose	
experience	in	the	present	is	difficult	or	framed	as	problematic.	Crucially,	the	
potentiality	of	a	better	future	cannot	be	attained;	with	diets	there	is	always	the	
need	to	maintain	weight	loss;	with	makeovers	vigilance	is	required	to	not	slip	
back	into	old	habits;	with	cosmetic	surgery	there	are	new	procedures	or	new	
fashions	that	may	be	taken	up;	and	with	surgical	procedures	there	is	often	the	
need	for	further	procedures,	as	the	body	may	fall	back	into	its	old	shape.	There	is	
always	room	for	more	improvement	of	the	body	and	self.	
	
In	these	examples	the	efforts	at	self-transformation	are	most	often	in	the	service	
of	achieving	a	relatively	homogeneous	kind	of	body	and	self,	which	fits	within	
hegemonic	values	of	femininity,	heterosexuality,	consumption,	and	capitalism.	
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Self-transformation,	understood	in	terms	of	affective	futurity,	is	therefore	
gendered.	In	this	sense,	self-transformation	can	be	understood	in	terms	of	social	
and	cultural	power.	The	gendered	(and	also	classed,	raced,	sexualized,	and	aged)	
body	necessitates	change	and	transformation:	bodies	must	become	better	in	the	
future.	Power	here	thus	functions	as	and	through	potentiality:	it	concerns	not	
only	what	is	but	also	what	might	or	what	should	be.	For	example,	certain	bodies	
are	compelled	to	feel	dissatisfied	with	how	they	are	in	the	present,	and	must	
therefore	work	toward	the	promise	of	a	potentially	better	future.	Power	also	
functions	as	potentiality	in	that	the	potential	of	a	better	future	always	exceeds	its	
actualization:	the	potential	of	the	future	can	never	be	attained.	
	
In	sum,	an	understanding	of	affective	futurity	as	potentiality	rests	on	the	idea	
that,	while	the	future	is	not-yet,	it	is	also	not	a	time	that	is	completely	separate	to	
the	present.	The	future	is	a	potentiality	in	the	present	that	is	aimed	or	worked	
toward,	even	if	it	may	never	be	reached	or	achieved.	the	potentiality	of	the	better	
future	directly	determines	actions	taken	in	the	present:	The	dieter,	for	instance,	
makes	ongoing	restrictions	on	the	intake	and	output	of	calories	in	order	to	reach	
a	specific	target	weight	in	the	future.	Feminists	and	queer	theorists	take	action	in	
the	present	in	an	effort	to	materialize	a	different	and	better	society	in	years	to	
come.	In	these	various	ways,	the	potentiality	of	the	future	exists	in	the	present.	
	
Affective	Futurity	and	Intensity	
As	affective,	the	potentiality	of	the	future	exists	within	the	present	as	a	
particularly	intense	feeling	or	affect.	To	recall	that	one	of	the	definitions	of	affect	
is	a	force	that	registers	in	the	body	(and/or	the	brain),	affect	may	be	understood	
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as	(an)	intensity,	as	an	energy,	quality,	or	passion	that	moves	and	changes	
someone	or	something	(see,	for	example,	Massumi	2002).	In	the	terms	
summarized	here,	the	pull	or	lure	of	the	possibility	of	a	better	future	can	be	
understood	as	an	intensity.	Affective	futurity	is	an	intensity	that	is	felt	as	the	
desire	to	transform	and	change	the	body,	the	self,	the	social	world—or	all	of	
these.	
	
Potentiality	and	intensity	indicate	conflictual	states.	On	the	one	hand,	the	
intensity	of	the	potential	for	a	better	future	might	stimulate	those	interested	in	
creating	a	different	social	world	and	so	to	commit	to	feminist,	queer,	and	anti-
racist	movements,	for	example.	Better	for	those	activists	or	theorists	could	mean	
that	their	work	interferes	in	the	reproduction	of	oppressive	power	relations	and	
helps	to	create	a	society	that	is	open	to	diversity	and	multiplicity.	On	the	other	
hand,	as	forms	of	power,	social	categories,	inequalities,	and	differences	of	
gender,	sexuality,	race,	age,	and	ability	may	be	re-made	through	potentiality	and	
intensity.	This	is	the	case	in	the	examples	of	self-transformation	provided	above,	
where	the	promise	of	a	better	future	reinforces	rather	than	challenges	the	status	
quo.	From	the	perspective	of	affective	futurity,	power	works	not	(only)	through	
external	forms	of	coercion	such	as	rules,	regulations,	and	discipline	but	(also)	
through	intensity;	it	also	works	through	affect	and	materiality,	where	bodies	feel	
particular	things	and	act	on	them—for	instance,	a	desire	to	be	slimmer	or	
healthier	prompts	a	regimen	of	dieting	or	exercise.	The	point	here	is	that	
affective	futurity	involves	multiplicity	and	contradictions.	This	descriptive	
chapter	is	not	concerned	with	deciding	whether	affective	futurity	is	good	or	bad,	
positive	or	negative,	but	rather	it	explicates	some	of	what	affective	futurity	
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does—that	is,	the	chapter	describes	how	the	affectivity	of	the	future	organizes	
social	and	theoretical	movements	as	well	as	particular	kinds	of	bodies	and	
selves.	
	
Anticipating	and	Preempting	the	Future	
Anticipation	and	preemption	are	two	specific	modes	of	orienting	toward	and	
feeling	the	future	that	are	especially	salient	to	understanding	contemporary	
Western	power	relations	and	how	they	work	temporally.	
	
Anticipation	
According	to	feminist	theorists	of	science	and	technology	Vincanne	Adams,	
Michelle	Murphy,	and	Adele	E.	Clarke,	anticipation	is	a	“defining	quality”	of	
Western	societies	(2009,	247).	For	these	authors,	anticipation	“now	names	a	
particularly	self-evident	futurism	in	which	our	presents	are	necessarily	
understood	as	contingent	upon	an	ever-changing	astral	future	that	may	or	may	
not	be	known	for	certain,	but	still	must	be	acted	on”	(2009,	247).	What	they	
mean	by	this	is	that	anticipation	involves	the	present	being	directed	toward	a	
“contingent”	and	“ever-changing”	future.	While	what	may	happen	in	the	future	is	
uncertain—it	is	a	potentiality—it	nevertheless	“must	be	acted	on”;	events	that	
may	or	may	not	happen	in	the	future	come	to	shape	the	present.	
Moreover—and	importantly	for	the	focus	of	this	chapter—the	authors	note	that	
anticipation	defined	in	such	terms	is	an	affective	state:	
	
Anticipation	is	the	palpable	effect	of	the	speculative	future	on	the	
present.	.	.	.		As	an	affective	state,	anticipation	is	not	just	a	reaction,	but	a	
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way	of	actively	orienting	oneself	temporally.	Anticipation	is	a	regime	of	
being	in	time,	in	which	one	inhabits	time	out	of	place	as	the	future.		
(2009,	247,	original	emphasis)	
	
Adams,	Murphy,	and	Clarke	go	on	to	explain	anticipation	as	“palpable.”	The	
potentiality	of	the	future	is	felt	as	an	affective	intensity.	What	the	affective	state	
of	anticipation	involves	is	a	temporal	orientation	to	the	future	“as	if	the	future	is	
what	matters	most.	Anticipatory	modes	enable	the	production	of	possible	
futures	that	are	lived	and	felt	as	inevitable	in	the	present”	(2009,	248,	original	
emphasis).	
	
The	authors	focus	on	some	examples	of	anticipation	within	biomedical	practices	
that	involve	girls	in	particular.	They	discuss	how	practices	concerned	with	
reducing	breast	cancer	or	human	papilloma	virus	(HPV)	infections	(which	in	a	
minority	of	cases	can	turn	into	cervical	cancer)	increasingly	focus	on	prevention	
in	prepubescent	and	teenage	girlhood.	These	include	studies	that	attempt	to	
reduce	environmental	exposures	in	the	home—such	as	chemicals	in	cleaning	
products,	cosmetics,	furniture,	and	food—that	may	(and	may	not)	increase	the	
potential	risk	of	developing	breast	cancer;	they	also	discuss	the	promotion	of	a	
vaccine	against	HPV	infection	that	requires	administration	prior	to	a	girl	being	
sexually	active.	Such	examples,	they	argue,	indicate	a	“management	of	the	future	
within	anticipatory	regimes”	that	“requires	projecting	ever	further	back	into	
younger	years,	positing	the	future	as	urgent	in	ever	earlier	moments	of	
organismic	development.	Anticipation	thus	reterritorializes	and	expands	the	
domains	and	sites—not	only	in	space,	but	also	in	time—that	are	called	into	the	
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future”	(2009,	253).	
	
In	other	words,	in	these	examples,	the	future	extends	or	spreads	back	in	time.	
The	future	is	expanded	from	the	not-yet	to	“ever	earlier”	points	in	time	that	
become	crucial	to	act	on.	The	potential	of	developing	breast	or	cervical	cancer	as	
a	result	of	HPV	infection	in	adulthood	is	projected	“ever	further	back	into	
younger	years”	so	that	whether	or	not	these	diseases	will	manifest,	girls	are	
required	to	be	implicated	in	preventative	measures.	With	these	examples,	the	
important	point	for	discussion	is	not	about	whether	or	not	these	preventative	
measures	are	good	or	bad—efforts	to	prevent	breast	or	cervical	cancer	are	
arguably	worthwhile.	Rather,	the	point	is	that	anticipatory	regimes	have	become	
increasingly	prevalent,	and	these	regimes	draw	in	some	bodies	more	than	
others;	in	the	cases	of	breast	and	cervical	cancer,	girlhood	is	seen	as	particularly	
significant	to	bring	into	the	“domains	and	sites”	of	the	future.	To	return	to	how	
power	may	function	through	affective	futurity,	this	is	significant	because	the	
gendered	body	is	enrolled	in	such	schemes.	
	
Preemption	
Like	anticipation,	preemption	is	a	regime	that	involves	orientation	toward	the	
future.	The	distinction	between	anticipation	and	preemption	rests	on	whether	or	
not	temporality	is	conceived	as	linear.	Adams,	Murphy,	and	Clarke	argue	that	
anticipation	often	operates	through	prevention,	as	discussed	in	the	examples	
regarding	female	health.	Cultural	theorist	of	affect	Brian	Massumi	(1956–)	
argues	that	prevention	is	underpinned	by	a	linear	temporality;	it	is	rooted	in	the	
present	and	seeks	to	prevent	an	event	(such	as	cancer)	happening	in	the	future.	
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Massumi	suggests	that	linear	temporality	is	disrupted	through	preemption;	
preemption,	he	writes,	
	
does	not	prevent,	it	effects.	It	induces	the	event,	in	effect.	Rather	than	
acting	in	the	present	to	avoid	an	occurrence	in	the	future,	preemption	
brings	the	future	into	the	present.	It	makes	the	present	the	future	
consequences	of	an	eventuality	that	may	or	may	not	occur,	indifferent	to	
its	actual	occurrence.	The	event’s	consequences	precede	it,	as	if	it	had	
already	occurred.	(2005,	8)	
	
In	Massumi’s	conception	here,	a	preemptive	measure	in	the	present	may	or	may	
not	result	in	preventing	an	event	in	the	future,	but	the	action	ensures	that	the	
future	is	brought	into	the	present.	Whether	or	not	an	event	has	occurred	or	will	
occur,	with	preemptive	regimes,	it	is	“as	if”	the	event	“had	already	occurred”;	the	
event	is	induced,	according	to	Massumi—or	brought	into	being,	or	actualized—
in	its	effect.	The	important	point	is	that	while	anticipation	aims	to	prevent	
something	happening	in	the	future,	with	preemption,	the	future	is	brought	into	
the	present.	Hence,	time	is	not	understood	to	progress	in	a	linear	fashion	(from	
past	to	present	to	future)	but	is	scrambled.	
	
One	of	the	examples	that	Massumi	explores	to	develop	this	idea	of	preemption	is	
the	fear	of	the	threat	of	future	terrorist	attacks	that	was	generated	in	the	United	
States	and	other	parts	of	the	Western	world	following	the	September	11,	2001,	
attacks	by	al-Qaeda	using	US	planes.	Massumi	argues	that	“threat	triggers	fear.	
The	fear	is	of	disruption.	The	fear	is	disruption”	(2005,	3)—or	in	other	words,	
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the	threat	of	future	terrorist	attacks	on	the	United	States	triggers	fear	of	
disruption,	and,	as	an	affective	state,	fear	of	disruption	becomes	disruptive	itself.	
The	effects	of	a	possible	future	attack	come	to	be	felt	in	and	as	the	present,	as	if	
the	possible	future	attack	had	already	taken	place.	
	
A	further	example	of	a	preemptive	logic	is	the	threat	of	an	obesity	crisis	in	the	
future.	In	the	United	Kingdom,	this	has	led	to	a	government-funded	study	on	the	
risks	to	both	individual	people	and	to	the	nation’s	economy	and	the	creation	of	a	
public	health	campaign,	Change4Life,	that	through	encouraging	exercise	and	
healthy	eating,	aims	to	halt	rising	obesity	levels.	Although	the	campaign,	which	
began	in	2009,	is	described	by	the	Department	of	Health	(2010,	13)	as	
preventative,	it	can	be	better	understood	as	preemptive	in	its	widespread	
attempts	to	encourage	people	to	become	healthier	now.	In	its	television	
advertising,	for	example,	the	campaign	urged	viewers	into	immediate	action:	“60	
active	minutes.	Just	one	of	the	ways	to	change	for	life.	Search	Change4Life	or	call	
0300	123	4567	for	your	free	info	pack.	Now.”	A	coordinated	campaign	called	
Start4Life,	aimed	at	pregnant	women	and	new	mothers,	instructed	with	equal	
urgency:	“It’s	never	too	early	to	get	your	baby	on	the	right	path	to	a	healthy	and	
happy	future.	Get	started	now!”	(Change4Life	website,	2011).	
	
To	take	up	Massumi’s	terms,	whether	or	not	an	obesity	crisis	occurs	in	the	
future,	the	crisis	is	brought	into	the	present,	so	that	the	effects	of	a	potential	
future	event	precede	it:	in	order	to	tackle	an	impending	obesity	crisis,	it	is	
necessary	to	act	“now!”	The	concept	of	affective	futurity	is	further	illustrated	in	
the	way	the	campaign	takes	up	the	threat	of	a	future	obesity	crisis	and	reframes	
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a	dystopian	future	as	one	that	could	be	better.	One	of	the	Change4Life	television	
advertisements	ends	by	saying	that	if	we	eat	better	and	move	more,	we	could	“all	
live	.	.	.		happily,	not	exactly	ever	after,	but	more	ever	after	than	we	had	done.”	
Here,	the	preemption	of	the	future	is	framed	in	terms	of	affect:	it	is	happy,	and	
thus	a	felt	intensity;	it	is	potential,	in	that	it	is	not	yet	actualized;	and	it	operates	
as	a	regime	of	power,	in	that	it	is	a	government-funded	campaign	into	which	
bodies	framed	as	obese	or	overweight	are	enrolled.	
	
Anticipation,	Preemption,	and	Power	
According	to	Adams,	Murphy,	and	Clarke,	anticipation	creates	“an	ethicized	state	
of	being”:	
	
Being	ready	for,	being	poised	awaiting	the	predicted	inevitable	keeps	one	
in	a	perpetual	ethicized	state	of	imperfect	knowing	that	must	always	be	
attended	to,	modified,	updated.	The	obligation	to	“stay	informed”	about	
possible	futures	has	become	mandatory	for	good	citizenship	and	morality,	
engendering	alertness	and	vigilance	as	normative	affective	states.	(2009,	
254)	
	
The	preemptive	logic	that	organizes	the	Change4Life	campaign	may	also	be	
understood	to	bring	about	what	Adams,	Murphy,	and	Clarke	call	“normative	
affective	states”	(2009,	254)—that	is,	identities	and	embodiments	that	adhere	to	
the	norm.	For	example,	while	the	government	report	that	engendered	the	
campaign	states	that	obesity	occurs	across	social	categories	of	class,	race,	age,	
and	gender	and	that	it	is	the	outcome	of	complex	social	and	environmental	issues	
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(rather	than	a	failure	of	individual	willpower),	the	campaign	targets	a	number	of	
social	groups	in	particular.	Mothers	(who	are	positioned	as	responsible	for	the	
health	of	their	family)	and	children	are	especially	addressed	(Evans,	Colls,	and	
Hörschelmann	2011).	The	program	also	targets	ethnic	minorities,	for	whom	a	
customized	campaign	was	commissioned	from	a	specialist	marketing	agency.	For	
these	groups,	then,	the	Change4Life	campaign	takes	on	a	specific	salience,	as	it	
requires	particular	people	to	feel	and	live	out	the	affective	state	of	a	future	threat	
being	brought	into	the	present.	It	is	these	groups	who	are	expected—for	
themselves	and/or	for	others—to	feel	the	threat	of	an	obese	future	and	the	lure	
of	a	better	(healthier,	happier,	longer-lasting)	future	as	an	affective	intensity.	To	
return	to	the	significance	of	self-transformation	introduced	above,	it	is	these	
groups	who	feel	transformation	as	a	requirement	or	imperative.	Specific	people	
and	groups	feel	and	live	out	anticipatory	or	preemptive	regimes,	and	difference	
and	inequality	are	therefore	made	and	remade.	Power	thus	works	through	the	
pull	of	affective	futurity.	
	
Hope	for	and	Optimism	about	the	Future?	
With	anticipatory	and	preemptive	regimes,	alertness	to,	and	vigilance	about	the	
future	become	normative	affective	states.	If	the	potentiality	and	intensity	of	the	
future	is	a	“defining	quality”	(Adams,	Murphy,	and	Clarke	2009,	247)	of	
industrialized	and	progress-oriented	Western	societies,	other	affective	states	
might	also	be	identified,	including	optimism	and	hope.	Optimism	and	hope	are	of	
a	register	similar	to	anticipation	and	preemption;	they	operate	as	modes	or	
regimes	of	feeling	and	orienting	around	the	future,	through	which	more	specific	
affects,	emotions,	and	feelings	(such	as	alertness	and	vigilance)	are	generated.	
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(Cruel)	Optimism	
As	discussed	above,	one	way	in	which	the	future	is	affective	is	through	the	image	
or	ideal	that	it	will	be	better.	In	this	way,	the	future	is	imagined	and	oriented	
around	optimistically.	Optimism	is	usually	regarded	as	a	positive	or	affirmative	
affect;	however,	feminist	and	queer	cultural	theorist	Lauren	Berlant	(1957–)	
suggests	that	an	attachment	to	the	idea	that	the	future	can	and	will	be	better	also	
functions	cruelly.	Berlant	explores	how	“tender	fantasies	of	a	better	good	life”	
(2008,	1)	permeate	cultural	forms	such	as	novels	and	films,	as	well	as	neoliberal	
political	discourse	(which	suggests	that	achieving	a	better	future	is	the	goal	of	
successful	citizenship	and	is	the	responsibility	of	each	individual)	and	everyday	
practices	(including	practices	of	self-transformation).	She	argues	that	these	
“tender	fantasies”	foster	“good	intention,”	which	“produces	an	orientation	
toward	agency	that	is	focused	on	ongoing	adaption,	adjustment,	improvisation,	
and	developing	wiles	for	surviving,	thriving,	and	transcending	the	world	as	it	
presents	itself”	(2008,	2).	But	the	world	“as	it	presents	itself”	in	contemporary	
capitalism	is	for	many	people	difficult	and	thus	the	desire	for	or	fantasy	of	a	
better	life	requires	constant	self-improvement—a	process	that	Berlant	labels	
“cruel	optimism,”	in	a	2011	book-length	study	of	the	adaptations	people	make	to	
pursue	this	better	life.	
	
The	concept	of	cruel	optimism	has	at	its	heart	a	paradox.	In	one	sense,	the	
fantasy	that	a	better	future	is	possible	“provides	something	of	the	continuity	of	
the	subject’s	sense	of	what	it	means	to	keep	on	living	on	and	to	look	forward	to	
being	in	the	world”	(Berlant	2011,	24).	The	difficult	present	is	made	bearable	
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precisely	though	the	fantasies	of	a	better	future.	Optimism	makes	“living	on”	
possible.	At	the	same	time,	attachments	to	the	ideal	of	a	better	future	are	cruel	in	
that	“the	subjects	who	have	x	in	their	lives	might	not	well	endure	the	loss	of	their	
object/scene	of	desire,	even	though	its	presence	threatens	their	well-being”	
(2011,	24,	original	emphasis).	That	is,	the	fantasy	of	a	better	future	(the	x	of	the	
“object/scene	of	desire”)	takes	on	such	prominence	in	a	subject’s	life	that	if	it	
were	removed	or	destroyed,	it	would	damage	that	subject.	While	the	fantasy	
keeps	subjects	going,	it	is	cruel	in	that	it	ties	them	to	a	“significantly	problematic	
object”	and	hence	“threatens	their	well-being”	(2011,	24).	
	
Berlant	explicates	the	concept	of	cruel	optimism	by	looking	at	the	modern	
experience	of	food,	eating,	and	obesity.	She	suggests	that	the	rise	in	levels	of	
obesity	has	occurred	as	“ordinary	people”	find	themselves	responding	to	or	
immersed	in	the	demands	of	contemporary	capitalism,	which	involves	“speed-up	
at	work”	(2011,	116),	constant	and	ongoing	self-transformation	and	self-
improvement	projects,	and	“time	organized	by	the	near	future	of	the	paying	of	
bills	and	the	management	of	children”	(2011,	116).	In	such	a	situation,	where	the	
future	bears	down	on	and	comes	to	be	felt	in	the	present,	“food	is	one	of	the	few	
spaces	of	controllable,	reliable	pleasure	people	have”	(2011,	115):	eating	(and	its	
preparation	and	sharing)	provides	“ordinary	and	repeatable	scenes	of	happiness,	
if	not	health”	(2011,	116).	Whereas	the	Change4Life	campaign	works	through	a	
notion	of	a	better	future,	Berlant	argues	that	“eating	adds	up	to	something,	many	
things:	maybe	the	good	life,	but	usually	a	sense	of	well-being	that	spreads	out	for	
a	moment,	not	a	projection	toward	a	future”	(2011,	117).	
	
	
	 19	
This	sense	of	“well-being	that	spreads	out	for	a	moment”	is	a	helpful	way	of	
understanding	both	the	rise	in	numbers	of	people	who	are	categorized	as	obese	
and	the	recidivism	rates	of	dieting,	where	the	vast	majority	of	diets	fail	and	
individuals	begin	them	again	and	again.	If	the	future	is	increasingly	felt	and/or	
brought	into	the	present	through	preemptive	regimes,	eating	as	conceived	by	
Berlant	is	a	means	of	being	in	the	present,	an	“interruption”	(2011,	115)	or	
“small	vacation”	(2011,	116)	from	“the	body	or	life	[as	a]	project”	(2011,	116)	
that	must	be	worked	on	in	order	to	achieve	a	better	future.	However,	Berlant	
again	notes	the	paradoxical	character	of	cruel	optimism;	when	eating	is	focused	
on	pleasure	in	the	present,	“there	is	less	of	a	future	when	one	eats	without	an	
orientation	toward	it”	(2011,	117).	In	other	words,	eating	for	pleasure	in	the	
present	may	result	in	a	less	healthy	and	lengthy	future.	
	
Through	her	concept	of	cruel	optimism,	Berlant	seeks	to	focus	attention	on	the	
present	rather	than	the	future.	She	is	critical	of	theories	that	emphasize	futurity	
because	they	“enable	a	concept	of	the	later	to	suspend	questions	about	the	
cruelty	of	the	now”	(2011,	28,	original	emphases),	and	she	explains	her	concept	
of	cruel	optimism	as	a	politics	of	presentism	that	disrupts	the	understanding	of	
political	activism	and	social	change	necessarily	being	organized	around	the	
future.	Here,	Berlant	is	drawing	attention	not	so	much	to	the	theories	of	
anticipation	and	preemption	that	are	discussed	above	(these	theories	approach	
futurity	in	a	critical	fashion	and	are	interested	in	how	anticipation	and	
preemption	can	operate	as	a	form	of	power);	rather,	she	is	pointing	to	how,	as	
also	discussed	above,	counternormative	politics	such	as	feminist	and	queer	
movements	often	focus	disproportionately	on	the	future.	She	sees	this	emphasis	
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on	futurity	as	problematic	because	it	distracts	attention	away	from	the	cruelty	of	
the	present	toward	a	“later”	or	not-yet.	Far	from	seeing	optimism	as	being	a	
positive	version	of	or	orientation	to	the	future,	then,	Berlant	draws	attention	to	
the	complex	and	contradictory	affectivity	of	optimism—to	how	it	both	sustains	
and	damages	living	in	and	with	capitalism.	
	
Such	a	project	of	thinking	critically	about	a	seemingly	positive	emotion	can	also	
be	seen	in	black	feminist	cultural	theorist	Sara	Ahmed’s	2010	book,	The	Promise	
of	Happiness,	in	which	she	looks	at	happiness	as	an	emotion	that	reproduces	
normative	values.	For	example,	to	be	happy,	one	must	adhere	to	
heteronormative	ways	of	living	(for	example,	being	heterosexual	and	belonging	
to	one	or	the	other	sides	of	a	gender	binary).	Such	an	argument	also	questions	
the	authenticity	of	affect:	for	example,	for	Ahmed,	the	feeling	of	happiness	is	
culturally	produced	and	thus	may	not	be	“true”	or	“real.”	Indeed,	Ahmed	
proposes	the	feminist	killjoy	as	a	figure	and	activity	whereby	feminists	and	
queers	point	out,	disturb,	and	change	how	happiness	becomes	a	norm.	
	
Hope	
In	developing	her	concept	of	cruel	optimism,	Berlant	makes	a	distinction	
between	optimism,	which	is	capable	of	focusing	on	the	present,	and	hope,	which	
she	sees	as	a	passive	patience	for	the	arrival	of	some	better	future	(2011,	13).	A	
similar	distinction	is	also	made	by	queer	theorist	Michael	D.	Snediker	(2009),	
who	sees	hope	as	a	faith	in	the	better	future,	whereas	optimism	has	a	focus	on	
the	present.	The	distinctions	made	by	these	authors	are	part	of	a	wider	debate	
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about	the	status	of	the	future	in	queer	theory	and	how	orientations	to	the	future	
may	be	understood	through	optimism,	hope,	and	other	affective	states.	
Some	queer	theorists	call	for	giving	up	on	the	future.	Perhaps	the	most	well-
known	exponent	of	this	position	is	Lee	Edelman	(1953–),	who	in	his	polemical	
book	No	Future:	Queer	Theory	and	the	Death	Drive	(2004)	argues	that	the	future	
is	collapsed	into	the	figure	of	the	Child:	indeed,	Edelman	argues,	the	Child	comes	
to	constitute	“the	perpetual	horizon	of	every	acknowledged	politics,	the	
fantasmatic	beneficiary	of	every	political	intervention”	(2004,	3).	In	other	words,	
politics	is	framed	in	terms	of	what	is	in	the	interest	of	the	future	generation	(see	
also	Stockton	2009).	Edelman’s	focus	is	on	American	politics	(for	example,	
speeches	and	policies)	and	popular	culture,	and	in	this	context	he	uses	the	figure	
of	the	Child	as	a	representation	and	a	rhetorical	symbol;	his	argument	does	not	
focus	on	“real”	children.	However,	feminist	theorists	Erica	Burman	and	Jackie	
Stacey	(2010)	contend	that	this	distinction	between	“real”	children	and	the	
figure	of	the	Child	is	difficult	to	maintain,	as	representations	and	rhetoric	cannot	
be	easily	separated	from	“real	life”	but	are	instead	involved	in	constituting	it.	
	
Edelman’s	specific	interest	is	in	interrogating	the	heteronormative	assumption	
this	collapse	of	the	future	into	the	figure	of	the	Child	both	rests	on	and	
reproduces.	He	argues	that	the	consequence	of	the	Child	being	the	“perpetual	
horizon”	of	political	intervention	is	what	he	terms	“reproductive	futurism”;	an	
understanding	of	the	future	as	reproduced	by	and	for	the	Child.	Because	it	rests	
on	this	figure	of	the	Child,	reproductive	futurism	“preserv[es]	in	the	process	the	
absolute	privilege	of	heteronormativity	by	rendering	unthinkable,	by	casting	
outside	the	political	domain,	the	possibility	of	a	queer	resistance	to	this	
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organizing	principle	of	communal	relations”	(2004,	2).	The	Child	comes	to	stand	
for	“our	way	of	life”—a	straight	way	of	life.	For	Edelman,	then,	reproductive	
futurism	is	heteronormative,	and	queerness	is	placed	outside	the	realm	of	
reproductive	futurism:	queerness	is	rendered	as	having	“no	future.”	
Edelman’s	suggestion	for	how	those	who	are	marked	as	queer	should	deal	with	
the	situation	of	having	“no	future”	is	not	to	turn	to	liberal	arguments	that	
demand	more	rights	for	queer	people;	he	does	not	propose	an	expansion	of	
reproductive	futurism	so	that	everyone	has	equal	access	to	it.	Rather,	he	argues	
that	queers	should	not	only	accept	but	embrace	the	“ascription	of	negativity	to	
the	queer”	(2004,	4).	Queer	theory	should	refuse	the	future,	“assert	itself	instead	
against	futurity,	against	its	propagation”	(2004,	33,	original	emphasis).	It	should	
take	up	the	negativity	of	being	outside	“generational	succession,	[linear]	
temporality,	and	narrative	sequence”	(2004,	60).	It	should	embrace	its	lack	of	
futurity	in	order	to	become	properly	queer.	
	
Another	queer	theorist,	José	Esteban	Muñoz	(2009),	takes	issue	with	Edelman’s	
argument	for	rejecting	futurity	because	of	how	that	argument	is	based	on	
accepting	or	embracing	negativity	as	an	exchange	for	the	pleasures	of	jouissance.	
As	a	concept	that	has	been	developed	in	French	poststructuralist	theory,	and	in	
psychoanalytic	theory	in	particular,	jouissance	refers	to	pleasure	and	enjoyment	
that	works	in	transgressive	and/or	excessive	ways.	This	pleasure	may	emerge	
through	the	enjoyment	of	rights,	property,	and	consumption	(of	objects,	images,	
and	texts),	and	it	also	has	a	sexual	dimension,	as	in	the	affective	pleasure	of	
orgasm.	Muñoz’s	argument	is	that	the	“jouissance”	that	Edelman	lays	out	is	
classed	and	raced,	so	that	it	is	only	white,	middle-class,	urban	male	queers—
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those	who	are	able	to	take	advantage	of	consumer	culture—who	have	access	to	
pleasure.	That	is,	while	some	may	be	able	to	turn	away	from	the	future	and	enjoy	
the	present,	the	appeal	of	the	future	remains	important	to	many	other	people.	
	
In	contrast	to	Edelman,	then,	Muñoz	argues	against	rejecting	the	future	and	
embracing	negativity.	Instead,	he	says,	
	
It	is	important	not	to	hand	over	futurity	to	normative	white	reproductive	
futurity.	That	dominant	mode	of	futurity	is	indeed	“winning,”	but	that	is	
all	the	more	reason	to	call	on	a	utopian	political	imagination	that	will	
enable	us	to	glimpse	another	time	and	place:	a	“not-yet”	where	queer	
youths	of	color	actually	get	to	grow	up.	(2009,	95–96)	
	
Muñoz	does	not	want	queer	theory	to	turn	away	from	the	future;	he	sees	the	
future	as	necessary.	As	such,	he	asserts,	“The	here	and	now	is	simply	not	enough.	
Queerness	should	and	could	be	about	a	desire	for	another	way	of	being	in	both	
the	world	and	time,	a	desire	that	resists	mandates	to	accept	that	which	is	not	
enough”	(2009,	96).	
	
Edelman’s	refusal	of	futurity	is	at	the	same	time	a	refusal	of	hope.	Hope,	he	says,	
“reproduces	the	constraining	mandate	of	futurism”	through	its	“insistence	of	
[itself]	as	affirmation”	(2004,	4).	Hope	is,	in	this	sense,	characterized	as	
necessarily	affirmative	and	as	necessarily	a	deferral	to	the	(reproductive,	
successive)	future.	However,	Muñoz	offers	an	alternative	understanding	of	hope:	
he	sees	hope	as	being	not	necessarily	tied	to	the	affirmation	of	reproductive	time	
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but	rather	being	about	“an	insistence	on	potentiality	or	concrete	possibility	for	
another	world”	(2009,	1).	Whereas	Edelman	defines	queerness	in	terms	of	
negativity,	Muñoz	argues	that	“queerness	is	primarily	about	futurity	and	hope”	
(2009,	11).	Edelman	defines	the	future	in	terms	of	the	preservation	of	
heteronormativity,	whereas	Muñoz	takes	the	position	that	“queerness	is	not	yet	
here”	(2009,	1).	
	
In	arguing	that	queerness	is	not	yet	here,	Muñoz	is	not	suggesting	that	a	queer	
future	is	some	far-off	time.	Rather,	his	understanding	of	futurity	is	developed	
through	the	potentiality	of	hope.	For	example,	Muñoz	explains	his	concept	of	
hope	as	an	“affective	structure	.	.	.	that	can	be	described	as	anticipatory”	(2009,	
3).	The	anticipatory	affectivity	of	hope	is	Muñoz’s	means	of	imagining	a	time	
other	than	the	“broken-down”	here	and	now;	it	is	an	anticipation	that	he	
describes	not	in	terms	of	a	deferral	to	the	future	but	instead	as	an	illumination	or	
animation:	“The	anticipatory	illumination	.	.	.	is	a	kind	of	potentiality	that	is	open,	
indeterminate,	like	the	affective	contours	of	hope	itself”	(2009,	7).	Hope	here	is	
potentiality:	“a	certain	mode	of	nonbeing	that	is	eminent,	a	thing	that	is	present	
but	not	actually	existing	in	the	present	tense”	(2009,	9).	
	
Muñoz	describes	hope-as-potential	of	as	having	four	interconnected	aspects.	
First,	hope	as	potentiality	is	an	anticipation	or	illumination.	Here,	anticipation	is	
not	so	much	a	regime	of	power	and	governance	(as	with	Adams,	Murphy,	and	
Clarke’s	argument)	as	it	is	a	spark	or	flicker	that	indicates	the	possibility	of	
another	kind	of	world.	Second,	as	potentiality,	hope	is	open	or	indeterminate.	
Hope	is	an	adventure,	where	the	destination	is	uncertain	or	unknowable.	In	this	
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sense,	hope	might	be	understood	in	terms	of	Kathryn	Bond	Stockton’s	concept	of	
the	“queer	child,”	“growing	sideways	more	than	up”	(2009,	37)—that	is,	it	
wanders	away	from	normative	models	and	resists	linear,	progressive	
temporality.	Third,	potentiality	is	affective:	it	is	a	feeling.	Fourth,	this	potentiality	
exists	within	the	present:	it	is	a	potential	“that	is	present”	(Muñoz	2009,	9)	but	
that	is	not	actual.	Taking	up	these	interconnected	aspects	of	hope-as-potential—
as	an	anticipation,	as	open,	as	affective,	and	as	existing	in	the	present—we	can	
see	that	hope	is	not	necessarily	a	deferral,	a	suspension	until	later,	but	rather	it	is	
a	potential	that	might	be	actualized	in	or	from	the	present.	
	
Such	an	understanding	of	hope—not	as	a	rejection	of	the	future,	nor	as	a	deferral	
of	the	problems	of	the	now	to	later—can	illuminate	the	relationship	between	
hope	and	optimism,	and	it	can	also	clarify	the	relevance	of	affective	futurity	to	
gender	and	sexuality	studies	and	to	the	organization	of	the	contemporary	social	
world	more	generally.	Taken	together,	hope	and	optimism	might	not	necessarily	
be	at	odds	in	their	focus	on	the	present	(optimism)	and	the	future	(hope)	but	
might	instead	both	be	pointing	to	the	necessity	for	a	conception	of	temporality	as	
nonlinear	and	as	multiple	and	diverse.	For	example,	because	the	modes	of	
anticipation	and	preemption	are	so	prevalent	in	contemporary	Western	
societies,	the	affectivity	of	contemporary	sociocultural	life	involves	the	future	not	
as	later	but	as	now,	as	in	the	present.	In	this	sense,	the	future	is	not	that	which	is	
beyond	the	present	(that	is,	a	time	that	follows	on	from	the	present	that	must	be	
waited	for)	but	instead	is	folded	into	the	present.	The	future	is	an	intensity	or	
potentiality	in	the	present,	but	affective	futurity	may	be	experienced	in	
contradictory	or	multiple	ways.	Feminist	and	queer	theory	must	remain	
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interested	in	the	future	because	the	future	is	a	central	aspect	of	the	present—and	
both	optimism	and	hope	are	modes	in	which	it	is	possible	to	explore	the	
affectivity	of	futures	and	presents.	
	
Summary	
This	chapter	discusses	a	range	of	different	approaches	to	the	affectivity	of	the	
future	within	gender	and	sexuality	studies.	It	focuses	particularly	on	the	
relevance	of,	and	debates	about,	affective	futurity—in	the	context	of	feminist	and	
queer	theory	but	also	in	terms	of	understanding	how	power	works	in	industrial	
capitalist	Western	societies.	The	concepts	of	potentiality	and	intensity	are	
introduced,	and	later	returned	to,	as	ways	of	understanding	the	future	as	
affective.	The	affectivity	of	the	future	is	developed	through	discussions	of	
anticipatory	and	preemptive	regimes,	where	present	action	is	oriented	around	
the	future	“as	if	[the	future]	matters	most”	(Adams,	Murphy,	and	Clarke	2009,	
248),	or	the	future	is	brought	into	the	present	so	that	the	effects	of	possible	
future	events	come	to	proceed	the	event.	Lastly,	optimism	and	hope	are	
considered	as	complex	affective	registers	where	the	future	and	present	are	
attached	to,	encountered,	and	experienced.	
	
Across	these	various	discussions,	temporality	emerges	not	as	a	straightforward	
linear	progression	from	past	to	present	to	future	but,	rather,	as	affective,	as	
nonlinear;	it	is	moving	and	flexible	in	a	way	that	involves	the	past,	present,	and	
future	being	in	changing	relations	with	each	other	(Adkins	2008).	Temporality	is	
capable	of	assembling	in	multiple	and	diverse	combinations.	Understood	as	
potentiality,	for	example,	the	future	is	in	the	present;	it	is	felt	and	lived	out	not	as	
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a	temporality	that	is	separate	from	the	present	but	instead	as	one	that	is	folded	
into	the	present.	Such	an	understanding	of	the	nonlinearity	of	affective	
temporalities	raises	questions	regarding	the	ways	in	which	potentiality,	
intensity,	hope,	and	optimism	may	be	studied	and	engaged.	Methodologies	are	
yet	to	be	developed	to	connect	with	or	relate	to	temporalities	that	are	affective—
temporalities	influenced	by	feelings	that	are	slippery,	changing,	transient,	or	not	
quite	actual.	Potential	remains	for	gender	and	sexuality	studies	to	inquire	into	
the	affective	registers	of	hope	and	optimism,	or	the	affective	modes	of	
anticipation	and	preemption,	and	write	about	them.	
	
The	chapter	further	looks	at	the	affective	as	well	as	temporal	operations	of	
power.	Gender	and	sexuality	studies,	in	line	with	the	social	sciences	and	
humanities	more	generally,	have	developed	rigorous	accounts	of	how	power	
works	in	repressive	and	disciplinary	ways.	But	theorists	are	only	beginning	to	
develop	understandings	of,	and	interventions	into,	how	power	works	affectively,	
through	affect	and	materiality,	where	bodies	and	subjects	(are	encouraged	to)	
feel	things	and	act	on	them.	Similarly,	while	the	social	sciences	and	humanities	
have	worked	out	a	range	of	ways	to	examine	how	power	works	spatially,	the	
temporal	aspects	of	power	relations	have	received	less	attention.	In	the	twenty-
first	century,	theorists	are	turning	their	attention	to	developing	frameworks	for	
understanding,	and	intervening	in,	the	way	power	works	temporally	to	make	and	
remake	differences	and	inequalities.	
	
Finally,	the	chapter	looks	at	the	way	the	image	of	the	better	future	has	been	
important	to	mobilizing	and	organizing	feminist	and	queer	theory,	as	well	as	
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other	progressive	and	radical	movements,	and	it	raises	the	question	of	what	
happens	when	the	ideal	of	the	better	future	is	problematized,	as	with	the	concept	
of	cruel	optimism.	It	summarizes	arguments	about	how	these	movements	might	
organize	when	the	future	is	in	the	present,	as	with	the	regimes	of	anticipation	
and	preemption,	and	with	the	register	of	hope,	and	how	the	potentiality	and	
intensity	of	a	different	kind	of	world	might	be	engaged	and	actualized.	Issues	
such	as	these	make	the	study	of	affective	futurity,	as	well	as	nonlinear	
temporalities	more	widely	crucial,	productive,	and	stimulating	for	gender	and	
sexuality	studies.	
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